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East Asian Financial Market Integration: 
Reality or Illusions? 
S. Ghon Rhee 
ABSTRACT 
The 1997·1998 Asian financial crisis, the agenda for local currency bonds 
and regional bond markets was a priority as an alternative vehicle for 
domestic saving mobilization and as a means of mitigating the dual mismatch 
problems of currency and maturity. To achieve this, the East Asian nations 
will need to be the main players in the regional bond market. Further, the 
corporation of Japan, China and Korea as the significant players in the 
regional bond is necessary to provide further liquidity and volume in the 
markets. The total investment in bond in the ASIAN, excluding Japan is less 
than one percent of total global bond investment. The potential development 
of East Asian bond markets is encouraging considering that the markets 
have increased from us$40l.7b in 1997 to us$I,419.8b in 2004, a 19.8% 
annual growth. However this is relatively small compared to the sIze of bond 
markets in other regions. For instance, the relative size of ASlUn bonds 
outstanding as measured by the percentage of combined GDPs amounted to 
40% in 2004. The same figures for Japan, USA and the EU are 190%, 160% 
and 90% respectively. In the ASEAN region, only Korea and Malaysia have 
a relatively large corporate bond markets. Most of the bonds in the region 
are government issued. Issues related to bond market are discussed by 
looking at the weaknesses and what are needed to encourage the development 
of the market. Three major concerns are identified; a strong sense of 
regionalism. overemphasis on the public sector's role and preoccupation 
with the harmonization of rules and regulations. On the hand, two issues 
need to be done; the creation of necessary infrastructure and the elimination 
of Impediments to cross-border investment. 
ABSTRAK 
Krisis kewangan Asia 1997·1998, agenda untuk bon matawang tempatan 
dan pasaran bon wilayah merupakan keutamaan sebagai satu penggerak 
alternatif kepada mobilasi simpanan domestik dan sebagai satu kaedah 
memoderasikan masalah ketidakpadanan antara matawang dan kematangan. 
Untuk mencapainya, negara-negara Asia Timur perlu memainkan peranan 
utama dalam pasaran bon wilayah. Tambahan lagi, kerjasama an/ara 
Jepun, China dan Korea sebagai pemain-pemain utama dalam pasaran bon 
wilayah adalah perlu untuk membekalkan kecairan dan volum dalam pasaran. 
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Jumlah Pelaburan bon dalam pasaran Asia tidak tennasuk Jepun adalah 
kurang daripada satu peratus daripada jumlah pelaburan bon global. 
Potensi pertumbuhan pasaran bon Asia TImur adalah menggalakkan dimana 
pasaran telah meningkat daripada us$401.7b. pada tahun 1997 kepada 
us$1,419.8b, pada kadar pertumbuhan 19.8% setahun. Bagaimanapun, 
secara relatifnya ia masih lagi rendah dibandingkan dengan saiz pasaran 
bon dalam wilayah-wilayah lain. Sebagai contohnya, saiz relatif bon Asia 
semasa diukur berdasarkan kepada peratusan KNK gabungan berjumlah 
40% pada tahun 2004. Perangkaan yang sama untuk Jepun, Amerika 
Syarikat dan EU adalah masing-masing 190%, 160% dan 90%. Dalam 
pasaran Asean, hanya Korea dan Malaysia mempunyai pasaran bon korporat 
yang secara relatifnya besar. Kebanyakan daripada bon dalam wilayah ini 
adalah terbitan pihak kerajaan. 1su-isu berkaitan dengan pasaran bon 
dibincangkan dengan melihat kepada kelemahan-kelemahan dan cadangan 
untuk menggalakan pertumbuhan pasaran tersebut. Tiga perkara ulama 
yang telah dikenalpasti adalah kekuatan semangat kewilayahan, penekanan 
yang berlebihan keatas pasaran seklor awam dan keseragaman peraturan 
dan perundangan. Seterusnya, dua isu yang perlu ditangani adalah 
pembentukan prasarana yang diperlukan dan penghapusan halangan-
halangan kepada pelaburan merentas sempadan. 
INTRODUCTION 
Subsequent to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the development of local 
currency bond markets in each of the East ASian economies as well as 
regional bond markets was the highest priority agenda among financial 
market policy makers. They view this development as an alternative vehicle 
for domestic savmgs mobilization and also as a critical means of mitigating 
the dual mismatch problems of currency and maturity. Many conferences 
and symposia have been organized and numerous policy research papers 
have been produced in support of the Asian Bond Market Initiatives 
spearheaded by APEC Finance Ministers and ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers. 
Many public sector organizations have been active in promoting both 
domestic and regional bond market activities. They include the Executives' 
Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks; the Pacific Economic 
CooperatlOn Council Finance Forum; and a number of multilateral financial 
mstitutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, Bank for International 
Settlements, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank. 
East Asian Financzal Market IntegratJOn 5 
AN OVERVIEW OF EAST ASIAN BOND MARKETS 
The size of local currency bond markets in the East Asian economies, 
excluding Japan, more than tripled from $402 billion in 1997, the first year 
of the Asian financial crisis, to $1.42 trillion in 2004, at an annual growth 
rate of 20 percent, which is approximately 2.5 times of the average growth 
rate of the world's bond markets (Table 1). 
TABLE 1. Size of local currency bond markets by regIOn 
RegIOn 1997 2004 Annual Growth Rate 
(in US$billion) (in US$billion) 
Worldwide $25,420 $44,049 8.2% 
United States $12.000 $19,187 6.9% 
EU-15 $7,013 $11,385 7.2% 
Japan $4,148 $8,867 11.5% 
East-Asia excl Japan $402 $1,420 19.8% 
Latin Amenca $468 $651 7.2% 
Source: SIS 
Among the East Asian economies, Indonesia exhibited the highest 
growth rate of 45 percent in long-term bonds outstanding between 1997 and 
2004, followed by Thailand with 30 percent, and China and Korea with 
about over 20 percent each (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2. Size of East Asian local currency bond markets 
Country 1997 2004 Annual growth 
(in US$billion) (US$billion) (%) 
Chma 116.3 483.3 22.6 
Hong Kong, SAR 41.1 46.5 1.8 
Indonesia 4.3 57.8 44.9 
Korea 130.3 568.4 23.4 
Malaysia 57.0 106.6 9.4 
Philippmes 18.4 25.2 4.6 
Singapore 23.7 66.3 15.8 
Thai1and 10.6 64.9 29.5 
Vietnam 0.8 
East Asia excl. Japan 401.7 1,419.8 19.8 
Source: SIS 
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THREE CONCERNS ON THE CURRENT STATUS 
OF ASIAN BOND MARKETS 
Are we happy with this remarkable growth in local currency bond markets 
in the region? Yes, we should be. However, I would like to share wIth you 
at least three of my concerns on the current status: 
The market share of East Asian economies (not including Japan) 
accounted for only three percent (or $1.42 trillion) of the worldwide local 
currency bonds of $44 trillion in 2004. My first concern is that this three 
percent could have been greater and here are the reasons why: 
I. East Asian economies (excluding Japan) contribute approximately 8 
percent of the global GDP. This means that the size of the region's 
domestic bond markets could have more than doubled. 
2. The relative size of Asian bonds outstanding as measured by the percentage 
of combined GDPs amounted to 40 percent as of 2004. This ratio is 
much lower than those of Japan (190 percent), the United States (160 
percent), and the EU (90 percent) (Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1. Relative SIze of East-Asian bond markets 
Source: HIS 
My second concern is that the rapid growth of Asian bond markets is 
attributed to the expansion of government bonds not corporate bonds. Given 
the double mismatch problems in maturity and currency faced by the corporate 
and banking sectors in the East ASian economies dunng the recent crisis, 
corporate bond markets should have expanded fastest among the three 
segments of the bond markets. After all, private sector financmg behavior 
was the main culprit of these mismatch problems, not government fiscal 
financmg (Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2. Composition of local currency bonds (in US$biIlion) 
My third concern is that the development of corporate bond markets is 
uneven in the region and the size of corporate bond markets is too small. 
China, Indonesia, and the Philippmes have yet to develop corporate bond 
markets. Only Korea and Malaysia have relatively large corporate bond 
markets. Excluding Korea and Malaysia, corporate bonds outstanding in the 
rest of East Asian economIes are less than 2% of their combined GDPs 
(Table 3). In contrast, Japan's corporate bonds are 17 percent of GDP, 
whereas the u.s. corporate bonds represent 21 percent of GDP. 
TABLE 3. Relative size of East Asian corporate bond markets 
China 
Hong Kong 
IndoneSia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
PhiJippmes 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Economy 
East Asia excl. Japan 
East Asia excl. Japan, Korea, Malaysia 
Japan 
United States 
Source: BIS 
As % of GDP 
0.73 
3.65 
1.47 
23.41 
38.14 
0.12 
5.14 
11.74 
7.70 
1.80 
16.86 
21.17 
INTRAREGIONAL INVESlMENTS IN ASIAN BONDS 
Next, I would like to present mtra- and inter-regional investment capital 
flows into Asian bonds (Table 4). Total global investment in bonds amounted 
to us$9 trillion or approxImately 22 percent of local currency bonds 
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outstanding worldwide. Asia's share of this investment stood at US$190 
billion or approximately two percent of global investment in long-term debt 
secunties. Japan is the largest recipient of global investments with us$108 
billion and Korea is the distant second wIth us$25 billion, followed by 
Malaysia (us$14 billion), Philippines (us$12 billion), Singapore (us$12 
billion), and Hong Kong (us$9 billion). If we exclude investment in 
Japanese bonds ($108 billion), total investment in Asian bonds was only $83 
billion or less than one percent of total global bond investment. 
TABLE 4. Investors In Asian bonds as of 2003 (in US$billion) 
Total Investments in Bonds Worldwide 
Total Investments in ASIan Bonds 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
IndoneSIa 
Chma 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Source: IMF 
9,127.8 
190.5 
107.5 (56% 
24.6 (13%) 
14.4 (8%) 
11.7 (6%) 
11.5 (6%) 
9.2 (5%) 
4.2 (2%) 
4.1 (2%) 
3.1 (2%) 
0.2 (0.1%) 
Who are the investors in Asian bonds? The Eu-15 is the largest Investor 
in Asian bonds with us$70 billion or 43 percent of the total, followed by the 
Untted States with us$54 billion or 28 percent (Table 5). Within the regIOn, 
Hong Kong is the largest investor in Asian bonds with its total annual 
Investment amounting to us$22 billion. Surprisingly, Japan's investment 
(us$l1 billion) In Asian bonds was even smaller than that of Hong Kong. 
To place intra-regional investment activities in proper perspective, the 
size of investments In Asian bonds by each of the East Asian economies 
relative to Its total investment in bonds outside their countnes is illustrated 
in Figure 3. An interesting fact emerges: Japan and Thailand invested 
disproportionately small amounts in Asian bond markets with three-fourth of 
one percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, while investment holdings in ASl3n 
bonds by Singapore and Malaysia amounted to 17 percent and 15 percent, 
respecllvely. 
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TABLE 5. Intra-RegionaJ Investments in ASIan bonds 
Region 
EU-15 
United States 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Singapore 
Korea 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Others 
Total Investment 
Value (in US$billion) 
70.2 (37%) 
53.8 (28%) 
22.3 (12%) 
10.8 (6%) 
9.9 (5%) 
1.1 (0.57%) 
0.2 (0.01%) 
0.2 (0.01%) 
0.1 (0.00%) 
0.1 (0.00%) 
21.8 (11%) 
190.5 (100.00%) 
FIGURE 3. ReJative size of intra-regional investments 
JAPAN FAILURE OF MEETING TIlE REGION'S FINANCING NEEDS 
A couple of questions have to be raised: 
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• Why are intra-regional investments in Asian bonds so small? A recent 
study by Arner, Lejot and Rhee (2005) cites two major reasons: First, 
too many legal and institutional impediments are discouraging 
investments in Asian bonds within the region. Second, institutional 
investors avoid ASIan bonds because of their concerns about investment 
risk. 
• The second question is "Why Isn't Japan more proactive in investing 10 
Asian bonds?" 
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To answer the second question, the summary statistics for market 
activities in Japan's Gaisai bonds are presented in Table 6. Gaisai bonds 
refer to those bonds issued in Japan by foreign institutions. If denominated 
in yen, they are called Samurai bonds, and if denominated in foreign 
currencies, they are called Shogun bonds. The last time foreign currency-
denominated Shogun bonds were issued was more than 10 years ago in 
1993. The volume of Samurai bonds peaked in 1996 with ¥3.8 trillion (or 
us$32 billion) prior to the Asian financial crisis, but it later declined 
drastically. Although the issuance of Samurai bonds increased in 2000, 
thanks to lower interest rates in Japan, the amount of issuance had substantially 
declined to 1.7 trillion yen or a mere us$17 billion last year. 
TABLE 6. Grusai hond markets m Japan (in ¥ trillion) 
Japanese Number of Samurai Number of Shogun 
Fisca1 Year Issues Bonds Issues Bonds 
1991 27 0.71 0.41 
1992 37 1.57 0 0 
1993 49 1.23 1 0.59 
1994 60 1.26 0 0 
1995 85 2.11 0 0 
1996 154 3.79 0 0 
1997 66 1.53 0 0 
1998 10 0.15 0 0 
1999 24 0.86 0 0 
2000 64 2.40 0 0 
2001 41 1.31 0 0 
2002 30 0.67 0 0 
2003 39 0.94 0 0 
2004 45 1.68 0 0 
Source: Japan Secuntles Dealers Assoclatlon 
Hong Kong and Singapore have small bond markets but they are critically 
important parts of regional bond market activities. How small are they? The 
size of the Japanese local currency bond market (us$8.9 trillion) is about 
130 times greater than that of Singapore bond market with outstanding 
bonds of us$66 billion and about 200 times greater than that of the Hong 
Kong market with outstanding bonds of us$47 billion. Despite of its small 
size, foreign institutions borrowed $34 billion by issuing non-SingS 
denominated bonds in Singapore in 2004, while no shogun bonds were 
issued in Japan ( Table 7). Relatively speaking, HK$ bonds issued by foreign 
borrowers accounted for over 20 percent of local market while V-denominated 
samurai bonds issued in Japan by foreign borrowers was only 2/10" of one 
East ASian Financial Market Integration JI 
percent. Even the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (IBIC), which is 
a govemment~owned financial institution dedicated to overseas economic 
cooperation, raises capital by issuing long-term bonds not in the Japanese 
Shogun bond market but in the Eurobond markets. IBIC issued long-term 
bonds denominated mainly in us dollar and the Euro to raise over 5 billion 
dollars between 2000 and 2004. 
TABLE 7. Companson between Japan and Hong Kong/Singapore 
Local currency bonds issued by Amount % of total bond 
foreign borrowers m 2004 market 
S$ bonds US$3.5 billion 5.3% 
HK$ bonds US$IO.6 billion 22.8% 
¥ bonds US$16.0 billion 0.2% 
Foreign currency bonds issued by Amount % of total bond 
foreign borrowers in 2004 market 
Non-S$ bonds US$33.7 50.8% 
Non-HK$ bonds No statistics available 
Non-¥ bonds US$O.OO 0.00% 
Sources: HKMA, MAS, JSDA 
Two major observations emerge: First, dunng and immediately after the 
Asian crisis when the Gaisai bond market should have been most active, we 
had a very slow market in Japan. Second, after a series of Big Bang reform 
measures that were initiated by former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
Japan simply cannot make Tokyo serve as a regional financial center. 
Why not? It can be attributed to a number of factors: (I) floatatIOn 
costs and processing costs are higher in Tokyo than New York, London, or 
Frankfurt. For example, I recall that investment banks add commissions 
when coupon interest payments as well as principal payment are made in the 
Samurai bond market, while there are no similar charges on the eurobond 
market; (2) it takes too long to issue bonds in Tokyo. It takes several weeks 
in Tokyo vs. three or four days in Eurobond market; (3) the recording 
system and clearing and settlement processes in the Samurai bond market 
are far more cumbersome than the eurobond market, where Euroclear and 
Clearstream are readily available and utilized for cross-border transactions. 
Naturally, an interesting question is "If Japan alone were unable to do it, 
how can we expect the 13 member economies of ASEAN+3 at different stages 
of capital market development to create regional bond market activitIes?" 
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ASIAN BOND MARKET ACTIVITIES ARE 
MORE GLOBAL WAN PERCEIVED 
A recent study by McCauley, Fung, and Gadanecz (2002) examined 71 
bonds, with a combined face value of us$41 billion, Issued by Asian 
borrowers during the period between 1999 and 2002. Of course, these bonds 
were mostly issued in New York, London, and Frankfurt, and only a small 
fraction in Tokyo. This study reported that about 45 percent of these bonds 
were purchased by Asian investors in the primary market offering. 
According to an academic study, which was presented at the PECC 
Finance Forum Conference in Honolulu in 2002, borrowers from six Asian 
countries raised us$53 billion through bond financing in the internatlOnal 
markets between 1991 and 2001. Asian lOvestment banks served as lead 
managers for one-third of this amount and the remaining two-thirds were led 
by their U.S. and European counterparts. The market share of Asian investment 
banks is surprisingly large, given that only 2 out of top 20 investment banks 
are Asian institutions. 
It seems that regional market activities are well integrated with global 
market activities. If this is the case, then what are the justifications for 
promoting regional bond markets? 
What do we mean by a regional bond market? It is the union of the 
three circles signifying: Asian issuers, Asian lOvestors, and Asian currencies 
(Figure 4). We may also include another circle that denotes Asian underwnters. 
My question here IS does it make any practical sense to promote such a 
narrowly defined market? 
ASian 
Investor 
ASian Issuer 
FIGURE 4. Narrow definition of ASian bonds 
ASian 
Currency 
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MAJOR WEAKNESSES OF ASIAN BOND MARKET INITIATIVES 
What are the major weaknesses of ASian Bond Market Imtiatlves? 
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Please allow me to share with you at least three major concerns about 
on-going efforts for the Asian Bond Market Initiatives. 
I. A strong sense of regionalism 
2. Overemphasis on the public sector's role 
3. Preoccupation with the harmonization of rules and regulations 
I. A Strong Sense of Regionalism 
The regionalism may be an overreaction to the so-called "Washmgton 
consensus" which became the object of resentment during the East ASian 
financial crisis. But, some of the troubling suggestions that have been under 
consideration include: 
• To have Asian bonds rated only by Asian credit rating agencies; 
To create an "Asia only" market where bonds are issued by Asian 
borrowers and purchased by Asian Investors; and 
• To facilitate transactions among Asian issuers and Investors, creating 
regional-level trading and cleanng & settlement systems. 
As long as Asian borrowers issue bonds at a minimum cost wherever it 
is and the majority of these bonds are purchased by Asian investors, everything 
else is secondary. It doesn't matter where they are issued, who rate these 
bonds, where they are traded, and where they are cleared and settled. 
Creating an "Asia Only" bond market will limit the number of bond 
buyers and discourage competitIOn in the primary and secondary markets, 
causing borrowing cost to increase and market liquidity to deteriorate. 
Efforts aimed at creating a business environment sheltered from outside 
competition will eventually force financing activitIes to move out of the 
region in search of lower cost funding alternatives. 
2. Overemphasis on the Public Sector's Role 
The public sector does not have to spearhead the creation of a regional bond 
rating agency, regional clearing and settlement system, and regional trading 
system. Some argue that a regional bond market is a public good, so the public 
sector should move in. But I do believe that this is a misleading argument for 
a number of reasons. 
As long as trading volume is justified, the private sector organizations 
will jump in no matter what. About IO years ago, at the inVItatIon of 
Euroclear, I visited its Brussel headquarters to deliver my speech on inter-
and intra-regional capital flows focusing on bond markets in ASIa. At that 
tIme, Euroclear's semor management wanted to assess whether the trading 
volume in bond instruments in Asia was large enough to justify ItS presence 
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In Asia. It has technical know-how and capital resources. As long as the 
volume is here, Euroclear would come to Asia for its operations without the 
public sector's help. 
Let's take a look at the eqUIty markets in the region. Shareholding of 
domestic securities by foreign investors amount to 40% in Korea, 30% in 
Thailand, 24% in Japan, and 11 % in Taiwan. I do not believe that the 
globalization of the region's equity markets was imtiated by the public 
sector in the region. Capital market authorities simply served as facilitators, 
eliminating impediments to cross-border investments. Under the private 
sector's own initiatives, we observe global investment activities in the 
region's equity markets. 
3. Preoccupation with the harmonization of rules and Regulations 
One lesson we should learn from the EU IS that achieVing financial market 
integration does not need harmonization of rules, standards, or regulatory 
integration. Financial market integration should be built on "mutual 
recognition" and uhome country contro1." A minimum level ofhannonization 
may be useful but harmonization itself is not necessary for regional integration 
of financial market activities. An overemphasis on harmonization can simply 
delay the progress towards integration. When we have 13 economies with 
the ASEAN+3 at different stages of bond market development, any effort for 
harmonizalIon will be tediously cumbersome and slow. 
So far, the regional efforts have been focusing on harmonizatIOn of rules 
and regulations across the region in creating regional bond markets, while the 
elintination of impediments to capital flows has been largely overlooked. 
Trying to create regional bond markets before elintinating existing impediments 
to capital flows in the region is like putting the cart before the horse. 
LOOKING FORWARD: WHAT DO WE NEED' 
Looking forward, what do we need? 
Create necessary infrastructure for the domestic bond markets 
• Eliminate impediments to cross-border investments 
At present, no more than one percent of local currency bonds outstanding 
are held by foreign investors in Korea and Thailand, even though their 
domestic bond markets are theoretically wide open to foreign Investment. 
The same observation can be made for other Asian economies, including 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Even Japan, with the world's largest 
amount of government bonds outstanding (us$4.8 trillion at the end of 
December 2004), is no exception. Foreign holdings of Japanese government 
bonds account for no more than 4 percent of the outstanding amount. 
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THE PUBLIC SECfOR'S ROLE 
The last question I would like to raIse IS "What should be the public sector's 
role?" The public sector's role is needed in at least two areas in connection 
with the Asian bond market initiatives: 
I. Creation of the Asian common currency 
2. Credit enhancement and Credit Guarantee Agency 
1. Creation of the Asian common currency 
Valuable lessons can be learned from Europe. The elimination of exchange 
risk. the harmonization of market practices. the repdenomination of 
government debt issued by each EU member into euro have introduced a 
bigger, deeper, more liquid, and more homogeneous bond market In Europe. 
Similar advantages should be gained in the region through full or partial 
currency unificatIOn as a result of common or partially shared monetary 
policies in the region's economies. 
Movements toward an Asian common currency cannot be done by the 
private sector. This is one area East Asian governments should be actively 
engaged. So far, I have not seen any official dialogue in this direction among 
ASEAN+ 3 member economies. Because I believe that the Asia-Europe or 
ASEM Finance Ministers' process would be an ideal forum to discuss the 
issue of the Asian monetary union, I had a chance to check the ASEM Work 
Programs 2004-2006, but nothing related to the Asian monetary union was 
on the programs. 
2. Credit Enhancement and Credit Guarantee Agency 
I have been advocating the creation of the Asian Bond Bank, modeled after 
municipal bond banks, since the 2"' Annual Meeting of PECC Finance Forum 
in Hua-Hin, Thailand, in 2003. I also believe that the creation of a 
multilateral financial institution, such as the Asian Bond Bank, belongs to 
the public sector's scope of activities. 
The municipal bond banks represent a financial innovation in municipal 
financing that began in Canada in 1956 and was adopted in the United States 
in 1970. Many small municipalities lack knowledge of finanCIal markets. 
They suffer from low credit rating and need to borrow relatIvely small 
amounts of capital. Municipal bond banks operate as credit enhancing 
organizations by "pooling" borrowing needs of multiple mUnIcipalities Into 
a SIngle bond bank debt issuance. Municipal bond banks have good track 
record of their success as evidenced by the Municipal Finance Authority of 
British Columbia or the Bond Bank of Alaska. 
The Asian Bond Bank can share the benefits gained from the economies 
of scale In borrOWIng cost and greater liquidity with larger size bond Issues. 
Most important of all, the Asian Bond Bank can re-lend funds raised at its 
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higher credit rating to participating Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign 
borrowers through its own credit enhancement programs as municipal bond 
banks do, including structured debt issuance and bond insurance programs. 
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION 
Whenever I had the opportunities to talk in Washington, D.C., I keep 
reminding the u.s. authorities of the absence of u.S. economic leadership in 
the regIon. The lack of u.S. involvement in the regional activIties means the 
loss of future business opportunities for u.S. financial institutions and the 
u.s. image of uninterested economic partner to East Asian counterparts. 
What about Japan's economic leadership? I would not claim that 
Japan's economic leadership is absent, but it is simply misplaced and 
misfocused. I expect that China's role in the region's capital markets will 
remam msignificant until its capital account is completely liberalized. 
Therefore, we have the vacuum of economic leadership in the region, which 
provides interesting challenges and opportunities for Malaysia. 
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